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Physical contact remains difficult to trace in large metropolitan networks, though it is a key vehicle for the
transmission of contagious outbreaks. Co-presence encounters during daily transit use provide us with a city-
scale time-resolved physical contact network, consisting of 1 billion contacts among 3 million transit users.
Here, we study the advantage that knowledge of such co-presence structures may provide for early detection of
contagious outbreaks. We first examine the “friend sensor” scheme - a simple, but universal strategy requiring
only local information - and demonstrate that it provides significant early detection of simulated outbreaks.
Taking advantage of the full network structure, we then identify advanced “global sensor sets”, obtaining
substantial early warning times savings over the friends sensor scheme. Individuals with highest number of
encounters are the most efficient sensors, with performance comparable to individuals with the highest travel
frequency, exploratory behavior and structural centrality. An efficiency balance emerges when testing the
dependency on sensor size and evaluating sensor reliability; we find that substantial and reliable lead-time
could be attained by monitoring only 0.01% of the population with the highest degree.
INTRODUCTION
Digital traces generated by citizens, during their com-
mute across metropolitan transportation networks are helping
answer long-standing questions on topics from individual
mobility to collective interaction patterns. A series of land-
mark papers examining multiple large-scale digital traces has
shifted the understanding of individual mobility patterns from
random to highly structured and predictable [1–5]. This has
important implications in urban dynamics and epidemiology,
particularly as the reproducible structure of metropolitan
face-to-face encounters does significantly shape the spatial-
temporal dynamics of disease spreading [6–8]. Therefore,
advances in deciphering metropolitan encounter patterns play
an important role in detection and mitigation of contagious
outbreaks [9–11].
In detecting and containing contagious outbreaks, it is
crucial to identify “super-spreaders”, as they may provide sig-
nificant lead indicators for the early response of public health
agencies [12, 13]. To measure an individual’s importance
in spreading processes, various centrality measures, such
as degree, betweenness, closeness [14], k-shell index [13]
and activity potential [15] have been applied to theoretical
diffusion models. Recent empirical works have confirmed
the importance of these diverse measurements in real-world
diffusion processes [13, 15–20]. To obtain such measure-
ments, full knowledge about the contact network structure
is usually required; however, other than simulating human
interaction at this level of resolution [6, 10, 21], mapping such
structure from real-world physical contact processes could be
expensive to collect, computationally costly, laborious in the
filtering of spurious connectivity, and privacy-sensitive [7, 22–
24]. This has been particularly true for large metropolitan
contact networks, where the availability of citywide datasets
is still limited [25, 26].
Disease monitoring is extremely costly, privacy sensitive,
and involves enormous technical difficulties. A low-cost
contact network structure constructed from transit use may
provide a way to design efficient monitoring strategies using a
small fraction of the population. In this work, we examine
the largest metropolitan encounter dataset collected to date
- travel smart card data from all of Singapore’s bus users,
covering approximately 3 million users during 1 week. Using
one week’s tapping-in/tapping-out data collected from public
transit services in Singapore, we built a large-scale high-
resolution physical contact network. In a recent study based
on this dataset, we demonstrated that physical encounters
display a significant degree of temporal regularity and these
rhythmic interactions form a large-scale spatial-temporal
contact network, spanning all of Singapore for the whole week
[5]. The study emphasizes that encounters at this fine-grained
scale are also very structured, and far from random. If the
former study identified the global behavioral properties that
generate this citywide co-presence network, our present study
tries to identify the key individuals’ network properties that
can be exploited to combat the spread of infectious disease.
As an alternative to constructing a global structure of
contact networks, recent research exhibits an increasing
interest in applying crowd-sourcing as a potential strategy to
detect contagious outbreaks, from using declared “friends as
sensors”, to aggregated search engine queries, to social media
[27–32]. Although these methods proposed are based on
simple principles and require only small slices of information,
they also show great advantages in providing early warning.
Still, interesting questions remain in comparing the possible
gains of using full knowledge vs. local methods in an
epidemiological city-wide scenario. We perform such study
in this high-resolution network, as a first evidence of its kind
at a population and metropolitan level.
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FIG. 1. Modeling contagious outbreaks in a city-scale physical contact network. (A) Simulated infection processes from one infectious
individual (red square). The encounter network is drawn in two layers: effective infection path (solid links in full color) and the remainder
physical encounters (thin links with opacity). (B) Temporal (hourly) change of susceptible and exposed people and infected people across the
population. The results come from one simulation with contagion rate β = 0.0015, demonstrating how transit users become infected from day
to day. (C) Temporal ratio of infected and susceptible from 20 simulations with different contagion rate β . The solid curves show average
ratios 〈IP/NP〉 over 20 runs and error bars indicate standard deviation. The dashed curves show the average trend of infected ratio 〈IS/NS〉 of
the 1% friend sensors. Lead-time can be estimated by checking time difference when 〈IP/NP〉 reaches certain value. (D) Number of hourly
infection incidences during the week, from the same simulation run as in panel (B). The orange dashed curve and the blue solid curve illustrate
the temporal variation in population C and the selected friend group S, respectively.
RESULTS
To explore the dynamics of city-scale contagious outbreaks,
we applied a general Susceptible-Exposed-Infected (SEI)
model [33] to simulate the spreading processes (see Methods
and Supplementary Note 1). Briefly, a simulation run is
initialized with ten infectious people (as index cases), who
are selected randomly among all transit users on Saturday.
In the temporal weighted physical encounter network (with
each contact as an edge and its duration as weight), an
infectious individual i will transmit disease to neighbor j
with probability pi j = βdi j per 20 seconds (contagion rate
β is a universal parameter across the population and di j
represents encounter duration; see Fig. 1A for example).
Once a susceptible individual get exposed, he/she becomes
infectious after 2 hours, starting to spread the disease to
other susceptible people. As almost all transit journeys are
shorter than 2 hours, the introduction of this exposure stage
prevents one from getting infected and then infects others
directly during the same journey (which will significantly
boost the spreading as instantaneous networks for a vehicle
is always fully connected). Note that β = 0.003 is used in
a high-resolution contact network in Ref [7, 20]; we apply
comparable values in our simulations. The full temporal
resolution enables us to simulate the spreading processes
during the whole week based on the proposed scheme for
detecting contagious outbreaks, by registering infection time
and transmission pathway on individual levels (Fig. 1B).
As mentioned above, a simple, but effective strategy for
early detecting contagious outbreaks without mapping the
detailed structure of a social network is to find friend sensors
from the population [22]. The inherent principle behind this
method: a randomly selected “friend” (neighbor; in a friend
group) of one vertex (in a control group) has higher degree
on average when the network has a heterogeneous degree
distribution, implying that friend group is more central than
the control group (or the population as a whole). This is
commonly referred as the “friendship paradox”; your friends
have more friends than you do [34]. However, as social
links initiated by physical encounters with strangers display
a significant degree of heterogeneity, it remains unclear
whether the friend sensor scheme - obtained from a static
network structure - works in temporal spreading processes.
Hence, to assess performance of the friend sensor scheme,
we conducted multiple simulation experiments with different
contagion rates β . In each simulation, we first select 1%
individuals from population P randomly as a control set C :=
{ci|ci ∈ P}; the corresponding sensor group S is composed
3of randomly selected neighbors of each individual in C
(S := 〈si|si ∈ N (ci) ,ci ∈C〉, and N (ci) is a neighbor set of
individual ci). Note that S is a list instead of a set since an
individual might be selected repeatedly from different N (ci).
After obtaining results from 20 simulations, we measured
the average infected ratio 〈IS/NS〉 of the sensor groups and
〈IP/NP〉 of the whole population temporally, finding that
friend sensors have large lead-times (Fig. 1C). Given the
heterogeneous individual participation and size of the time
window [35], spreading exhibits a linear increase - instead of
a saturation process - after the explosive stage.
In Fig. 1D, we show the temporal change of infection
incidence i(t) from the same simulation as Fig. 1B. The
sensor group S is obtained by the same selection scheme;
however, in this case, the control group C is the whole
population. Together with Fig. 1C, we found that spreading
in S not only happens earlier, but also faster than in the
whole population, suggesting that the lead-time also varies
with time (or infected ratio; see Supplementary Note 3 and
Supplementary Fig. S1 and S2). Notably, although the
temporal structure is not used in finding sensors, the friend
sensor scheme is still efficient in early detecting outbreaks in
our simulation experiments.
Considering that friend sensors are identified locally with-
out using any centrality measures, they could be representative
of a universally applicable strategy when it is costly or impos-
sible to map the detailed network structure. To investigate
the superiority of friend sensors in a comparable manner,
we employed different centrality measures to quantify an
individual’s importance based on the both network structure
and individual travel behavior employing the following cen-
trality measures (see Supplementary Note 2): (1) Degree
k, measuring total number of contacts of each individual
during the week, (2) Travel frequency f , frequency of taking
public transit services, ( f could also be interpreted as number
of activities in temporal networks [15]) (3) Shell index ks,
taken from k-shell decomposition [13] on the static network
and (4) Encounter entropy S, capturing temporal diversity of
encounters:
S =−∑
t
pt ln pt , (1)
where pt is the probability of an individual’s physical
encounter in time t (hourly). Using time-stamped encounter
transactions, we can build the whole contact network and
determine individual’s centrality for both control and sensor
sets (see Fig. 2).
Indeed, a sensor group is more central than the randomly
selected control group in terms of degree k (Fig. 2A); however,
it is not yet known whether the friend paradox applies to
other measures related to travel behavior (other than network
structure). Before looking for additional sensors, we first
measured other centrality distributions P( f ), P(ks) and P(S)
using both population and friend sensors. Although most
people traveled less than 5 times during the week, we still
found that P( f ) was characterized by a heavy tail across the
k
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FIG. 2. The “friendship paradox” exhibited in temporal encounter
network. (A) Degree distributions P(k) of population and their
neighbors (friends). The average degrees are 〈k〉control = 238.5 and
〈k〉sensor = 442.0, respectively. (B) Probability density function P( f )
of stage frequency of population and neighbor set. The inset shows
the same plot in semi-log scale. The mean values are 〈 f 〉control = 8.0
and 〈 f 〉sensor = 13.0. (C) Probability density functions P(ks) of shell
index ks. The mean values are 〈ks〉control = 120.5 and 〈ks〉sensor =
167.3. (D) Distribution of encounter entropy S. The density function
P(S) has centralized peaks around ln1 = 0, ln2 = 0.693, ln3 =
1.099 and ln4 = 1.386, resulting from individuals with homogenous
encounters in corresponding number of intervals. The mean values
of encounter entropy are 〈S〉control = 1.35nat and 〈S〉sensor = 2.00nat.
The purple dashed lines in all these panels (from left to right) indicate
the 90th, 99th, 99.9th and 99.99th percentiles of corresponding values
across the whole population, explaining the degree of heterogeneity
among most centrally located individuals, friend sensors and the
population as a whole.
population, indicating a significant degree of heterogeneity
in individual transit use pattern (Fig. 2B). Moreover, we
found that P( f ) of the sensor group clearly exhibited the
friend paradox as well, indicating that the people you have
encountered on buses traveled more often than you do. Using
the same control and sensor groups, we then obtained the
distributions P(ks) and P(S). As Fig. 2C and D demonstrate,
the friend paradox does exhibit in terms of shell index ks
and encounter entropy S as well, suggesting that friend
sensors have higher k-shell indexes and show higher temporal
encounter diversity than the population. Taken together, Fig. 2
suggests that the simple friend sensor scheme can universally
identify more centrally located social sensors. Nevertheless,
as the percentiles show (in all Fig. 2 panels), there are still
significant differences between the most central individuals
and friend sensors, further indicating that the efficiency of
4friend sensors might be limited. Taken together, as one
might expect, the simple principle of friend sensor scheme
also prevents itself from performing more efficiently, as better
sensors could always be obtained by using more information
on contact structure.
We next compare performance of the best sensors identified
by each centrality measure against friend sensors by quantify-
ing lead-time on a universal scale. When individual infected
time cannot be obtained across the whole population, lead-
time is estimated as difference between control and sensor
samples in general [22]. However, since transit services
are generally not operated 24 hours a day, the cumulative
infection curve is not strictly monotonic increasing during
the monitoring period in our case, resulting in significant dif-
ference when calculating lead-time from multiple runs; thus,
using instantaneous lead-time is a biased measure of sensor
performance (see Supplementary Note 3 and Supplementary
Fig. S2). However, given that individual infection time
can be traced from simulations, we can essentially quantify
lead-time against the whole population instead of a small
sample control group. For efficient early detection, we fixed
the monitored infected ratio αˆ = [α1,α2) = [0.05,0.25) and
measured only the difference of infection time of people in
αˆ , obtaining infection time tαˆP = {ti|α1 ≤ FP (ti)< α2} from
population and tαˆS = {ti|α1 ≤ FS (ti)< α2} from sensor group
(F represents the empirical distribution of exposed time). We
re-define lead-time as the difference of average tαˆP and t
αˆ
S :
T = 〈t〉αˆP −〈t〉αˆS (2)
Next, we ordered individuals according to their centrality
measure and divided the whole population into 100 per-
centiles. Using each percentile as a sensor group, we per-
formed 20 simulation runs and measured the corresponding
lead-times under different contagion rate β . As Fig. 3 shows,
the top 1% slices from all these partitions are able to provide
early detection; however, the less the average centrality is,
the shorter the lead-time T will be. For example, the sensor
group provides no advanced detection when k ≈ k0.4 and
even falls behind the general population when k > k0.4 (k0.4
is the 40th percentile of degree). In this case, lead-time
may reach infinity if the spreading cannot reach α2 (25%)
among sensor group. By comparing these centrality measures
jointly, we found that they actually vary consistently on
sensor composition; however, no one outperforms the others
significantly (see Supplementary Fig. S2).
The efficiency of using such sensors to detect contagious
outbreaks depends not only on centrality measures, but
also sensor size |S|. On one hand, a small sample size
induces large variation, providing poor reliability in potential
applications. On the other hand, the difference of average
centrality measure might be more and more significant given
the intrinsic heterogeneity of individual behavior, revealing
that we may achieve longer lead-time with lower cost (if
the cost is in proportion to sensor size). In Fig. 4A, we
chose degree as primary centrality and measured lead-time for
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FIG. 3. (A)-(D). Mean and standard deviation of lead-time for sorted
slices (1%) obtained by (A) degree k, (B) frequency f , (C) k-shell
index ks and (D) encounter entropy S. In panel (A), the dashed line
and error bars show lead-time provided by 1% friend sensors as a
guide. As no centrality measure is used in identifying friend sensors,
lead-time will not change by choosing alternative control groups.
All curves demonstrate a monotone increase approximately - except
sensors identified by ks; the top 1% even fall behind friend sensors
when β = 0.005.
logarithmically spaced sampling rate n = |S|/ |P|, spanning
from 0.001% (only 27 people with highest degree) to 100%
(the full population is used as sensors; lead-time is zero in
this case). As the figure shows, smaller sample size indeed
provides longer lead-time, but, with larger variation. In
Fig. 4B, we show performance of friend sensors obtained from
equally sized control groups. Given that the sensor group is
always sampled from a deterministic population, we observed
a constant average lead-time, independent of sampling rate
n. However, the standard deviation of lead-time decreases as
sample size gets larger in both Fig. 4A and B, corresponding
to the law of large numbers when calculating lead-time in each
simulation.
In practice, one should not just consider average lead-
time and monitoring cost of such sensors; their reliability is
equally important. To evaluate sensor reliability, we created a
simulation result set with 500 runs and measured the lead-
time distribution P(T ) for contagion rate β = 0.001. As
Fig. 4C shows, average lead-time of different sensor groups
(in terms of sensor sizes) is well characterized by normal
distribution, however, with significant mean and variance
difference. Notably, the top 0.01% group performs extremely
well for both average lead-time provided and reliability.
Fig. 4D shows results of the same analysis for the friend
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FIG. 4. Effect of sensor size on efficiency and reliability in detecting
contagious outbreaks. (A) Lead-time provided by sensors with
highest degree, with sampling rate n = |S|/ |P| in a logarithmically
spaced interval spanning from 0.001% to 100% with different
contagion rate β = {0.001,0.0015,0.002,0.005}. The error bars
correspond to standard deviation of T . (B) Lead-time provided by
friend sensors identified by random control group C of different
size. Given that sensors are characterized by the same distribution,
lead-time exhibits a convergence pattern with the increase of sample
size. In fact, with sampling rate n increases, the variance of T
determined from one particular simulation run reduces, resulting in
the decreasing overall variance. (C) Distribution P(T ) of lead-time
T given different sensor size |S| when contagion rate β = 0.001,
corresponding to panel (A). (D) The same plot as panel C, however,
for friend sensors corresponding to panel (B).
sensor scheme. We observed that the larger the sensor
size is, the more reliable the lead-time becomes; however,
increasing sensor size does not raise average performance,
consistent with what Fig. 4B shows. We also applied this
procedure to other centrality measures: frequency f , k-shell
index ks and encounter entropy S, finding that sensor group
identified by degree outperforms all other centrality measures
(see Supplementary Note 4 and Supplementary Fig. S4).
Taken together, Fig. 4 suggests that the friend sensor scheme
indeed provides a substantial lead-time in early detection;
however, the inherent principle prevents it from performing
better by adjusting sensor sizes (in other words, average
performance is independent on sensor size), whereas a well-
defined sensor (obtained by degree centrality in this case)
can easily outperform it. Our results further illustrate a
clear advantage of deriving sensors from the full co-presence
network, providing longer, more reliable lead-time by using a
smaller sensor group.
DISCUSSION
To summarize, we show the feasibility of a friend sensor
scheme in providing early detection during a contagious
outbreak in a metropolitan physical contact network. Indeed,
the simple friend sensor scheme, which does not require a
detailed network structure, works consistently well in finding
sensors that are more central in the network. However,
since all friend sensors are actually characterized by a
deterministic neighbor population based on network structure,
their performance is often limited by inherent characteristics
of the neighbor population, providing constant early warning
on average, independent of sample selection and sample
size. Therefore, it is still crucial to show the value of full
network structure, in particular for early detecting contagious
outbreaks. Taking advantage of individual-based passive
data collection techniques on city-scale (transit fare collection
systems in this paper), we mapped detailed spatial and
temporal structures as a whole and identified new sensors
given diverse centrality measures, offering new insight into
finding more efficient social sensors. Considering the weak,
passive and indirect nature of social links enabled by these
common daily physical encounters, k-shell index ks - a
well-defined structural centrality - is less effective than the
simple degree k and frequency f (number of activities) in
contagious detection. Note that we did not use betweenness
and closeness centralities as a measure in our study. On one
hand, computing shortest path-based centralities is extremely
time-consuming because of this network’s high density. On
the other hand, considering the temporal nature of daily
encounters, the role of static shortest path is not as significant
as it is in social networks of personal relations. Based on
the spreading settings examined in our study, a well-defined
social sensor group based on degree may account for only
0.01% of the total population; however, it provides longer
and more reliable lead-time - than the friend sensor scheme
- allowing public health officials and governments to plan
a quick and efficient response. In practice, those sensor
individuals can be easily identified by transit agencies given
their unique smart card IDs, and the remaining question is to
monitor the health status of sensor groups. Although sensor
groups are deterministic given our observations, it may still
not easy for public health agencies to monitor their status
owing to privacy and technical issues, which are beyond the
goal of our study. Nevertheless, one possibility is to use
the emerging ICT in health monitoring - such as health-care
applications in smartphones - and ask these special people
to willingly provide anonymous information to public health
agencies. Another possibility, assuming that health authorities
could have access to the identities of these sensor group
individuals, is to, instead of monitoring them directly, track
their appearance as cases of selected contagious diseases
reported by hospitals and local clinics. Were this sensor
groups to appear with a certain statistical trend in clinical
reports, we would have in our hands an early-warning signal
6for the future advancement of the contagious disease.
Having said that, influenza-like diseases are transmitted
primarily by close contacts. Although the network used in our
study is created across the whole metropolitan area, capturing
all transit users’ contacts during a whole week, it still covers
only a small slice of all potential contacts in our daily life,
forming only a subnetwork of a network of contacts that
would be important in the spread of actual epidemics. On
the other hand, to simulate an outbreak, we fixed relatively
unrealistic simulation settings, such as introducing only 2-
hour exposed period and using an simplified SEI model in-
stead of a full developed SIR or SEIR model, for the outbreak
to travel at a speed where global and local methodologies
could be tested. To what extent the simulation can match a
real contagious outbreak and the relevance of the simulations
findings to actual epidemics remain to be measured. Thus,
it is important to note that the specific results in our study
are embedded in the physical encounter network with a pre-
defined spreading mechanism. Such encounters on transit
vehicles occur more often between perfect strangers than
among friends, colleagues or families, making the network
incomplete for predicting epidemic spreading via all possible
transmission pathways. Therefore, great caution should be
exercised in interpreting the results. In reality, a full contact
network for disease spreading consists of all of social links
from diverse circumstances; it remains unclear to us which
part should be given priority with respect to the characteristics
of an unknown virus/disease. Nevertheless, with the rapid de-
velopment of information and communication technologies,
mapping the whole structure of close encounters from various
data would be far less difficult and laborious today. Given
the high individual and collective regularities rooted in human
behaviors [2–5], patterns of face-to-face encounters in various
settings could be documented as well [7, 24], helping us build
more comprehensive agent-based models to contain emerging
epidemics [10, 36]. Moreover, with our increasing knowledge
about ourselves and various microorganisms around us, more
efficient social sensors for different scenarios can be identified
and applied in monitoring contagious spreading from day to
day, providing early and accurate information to support better
decision making. We believe that our work can serve as a base
to help better combat the spread of disease on a citywide scale
[37, 38] and better understand social contagion dynamics [39–
41].
METHODS
Data sets
Trip records were collected from Singapore’s smart-card-
based fare collection system, covering more than 96% of
public transit trips. The system collects data for both bus and
MRT (subway) modes. Smart card data is widely used in pub-
lic transit: network planning, service adjustments, providing
ridership statistics, and indicating service performance. We
employ bus, not MRT (Mass Rapid Transit, railway based)
trip records in this study, since it is difficult to identify close
proximity interactions on large MRT trains. For buses, once
a smart card holder boards a vehicle (tapping-in), the system
generates a temporary transaction record; after he/she leaves
the vehicle (tapping-out), a complete record will be stored
with detailed trip information.
A full bus trip may contain more than one stages with
transfers from one route/vehicle to another. The stage records
are generated separately in the smart card system (with each
tapping-in and tapping-off). Since our goal is to identify
in-vehicle encounters and the people one may encounter in
vehicles will differ from stage to stage, we use the term trip
to represent stage in this document. After processing the raw
data, we obtained the trip records used in this study. The fields
and their contents are provided in Supplementary Tab. S1.
This study was performed on the trip records of one week
in March, 2012. The dataset contains 22,455,159 bus trip
transaction records from 2,969,320 individual smart card
holders.
Simulation
To evaluate the performance of social sensors in the
obtained interaction network, we use the SEI models to
simulate contagious outbreaks among all transit users [33],
which are assumed to be in one of two states: susceptible
(S) when they are prone to infection, exposed (E) between
exposure and infectiousness, or infected (I) when they can
transmit the disease to others. In studying the outbreak
dynamics, we are more interested in the initial spreading
processes and thus we do not consider the recovery stage in
the simulation.
All simulations start on Saturday and end on the next
Friday, spanning the whole week (given the dataset). In
the spreading process, the duration of explosive stage (such
that 0 < I/N < 1%) is highly determined by the number of
index cases. Thus, a smaller index size induces larger in
terms of temporal spreading processes; however, after this
explosion, the spreading becomes steady and contagion rate
β determines the spreading speed of the rest spreading. Thus,
to boost the initial spreading processes, we set ten index
cases in our simulation, enabling us to observe outbreaks
in one week. On the other hand, since people show great
heterogeneity in their transit use behavior (such that f ≤ 5 for
almost 50% of the users during the week), a larger number
of index cases also prevents the disease from dying out at
initial stage. However, as sensor performance is monitored
given infected ratio 5% ≤ FP(ti) < 25% (after the explosive
stage and during the steady spreading), lead-times and their
variability are mainly determined by β rather than number
of index cases (see Supplementary Fig. S5). Thus, all our
simulations start with ten infected people (ten infected cases),
randomly selected across all transit users who were active
on Saturday (who took buses on Saturday). After being
7infectious, individual i will transmit disease to a susceptible
individual j, who individual i encountered during his/her
journey, with probability pi j = β × di j (di j is encounter
duration). Here, β is an important parameter determining the
speed of contagious spreading. We chose a series of values
from 0.001 to 0.005 per 20 seconds. On one hand, these values
are similar to the value used in Ref. [7]. On the other hand,
by simulating the spreading processes with different β , we
can better evaluate the performance of different sensors for
outbreaks with different β . Given any instantaneous network
in a vehicle is a fully connected one, disease may spread
very fast once one individual get infect. To avoid this, we
introduce the exposure (E) stage - which lasts for 2 hours -
in our simulation: once an individual is exposed, he/she will
not spread the disease immediately; however, he/she begins to
begin to spread the disease to other encounter people after 2
hours. Considering that most transit trips take place in under
2 hours, one is unlikely to get infected and begin spreading
disease to others during the same trip.
In the simulation, each time step represents 0.5h, such as
7:00-7:30. In any step t, we first identify all the neighbors
he/she has encountered (the time they encountered each other
should be within this time step) and then get them exposed
with the defined probability β . The incubation time is selected
as a constant given the time granularity (2h), and thus, the
exposed individuals become infectious in step t + 4. We also
tested our results when setting the exposed period to be 6h
and 12h, finding that sensors identified by degrees performs
consistently better than others (Supplementary Fig. S6).
Based on these simulation settings, one can monitor the
temporal spreading dynamics from a set of simulations
with certain β and random seeds as initial infected people.
Meanwhile, individual infection time could be traced from
each simulation. As Supplementary Fig. S1 shows, although
contagion rate β in each panel is the same, simulations still
differ significantly from each other, in particular when β is
low. Thus, estimating lead-time universally is important to
establish the difference.
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9SUPPORTING INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE S1
TABLE S1. Fields and contents of trip record dataset
Field Description
Trip ID A unique number for each transit trip
Card ID A unique coded number for each smart card
(anonymised)
Passenger Type The attribute of cardholder (Adult, Senior
citizen and Child)
Service Number Bus route service number (e.g. 96)
Direction Direction of the bus route (0 and 1)
Bus Registration No. A unique registration number for each vehi-
cle (e.g. ‘0999’)
Boarding Stop ID A unique number for boarding stop (e.g.
40009)
Alighting Stop ID A unique number for alighting stop (e.g.
40009)
Ride Date Date of a trip (e.g. ‘2012-03-26’)
Ride Start Time Start (tapping-in) time of a trip (e.g.
08:00:00)
Ride End Time End (tapping-out) time of a trip (e.g.
08:00:00)
Ride Distance Distance of the trip (e.g. 12.0 km)
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 1: ENCOUNTER NETWORK
The physical network is built by identifying all in-vehicle
encounters (two individuals occupying the same bus at the
same time) using smart card transaction records. Based on the
detailed bus registration number and boarding/alighting time
of each bus trip, one can extract all encounters on a particular
vehicle by checking whether any two bus trips overlap in time.
By applying this procedure for the whole week, we obtained
a temporal contact network with 3 million vertices and 1
billion edges (with all transit users as vertices and physical
encounters between them as edges), across all of metropolitan
Singapore. Vertex attributes include Card ID and Passenger
Type; edge attributes contain encounter time and encounter
duration. The duration of each encounter is used to model the
weight of each social link. Detailed structural characteristics
of an encounter network can be found in Ref.[5].
In fact, many of the short encounters (less than 1 minute)
are created by passengers’ simultaneous boarding and alight-
ing at a particular bus stop without incurring any physical
contacts. Considering vehicle configuration and load profile,
occupying the same vehicle does not necessarily imply an
intense social contact, i.e. talking to each other. To account
for the effect of these short encounters which result in no real
interactions, we removed all edges with di j < 5min when
simulating the contagious outbreak. The final network for
simulation consists of 2.7 million vertices and 0.3 billion
edges.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 2: CENTRALITY MEASURES
Degree
Degree of vertex i is defined as the number of neighbors
(contacts in this article):
k (i) = ∑
j∈N(i)
ai j, (S1)
where N (i) is the neighbor set of vertex i and ai j = 0,1,2, · · ·
is the number of edges (contacts) between i and j. Degree is a
local index without considering the importance of neighbors.
Frequency
Given the strong heterogeneity exhibited in individual
transit use pattern, travel frequency f (i), which register the
number of times individual i took public transit services
during the studied week, could be a measure of centrality
as well. This measure could be interpreted as number of
activities in temporal interactions [15].
k-shell Index
The k-shell index ks is obtained from k-shell (or k-core)
decomposition [13]. The decomposition process starts with
removing all vertices with k = 1 recursively until k ≥ 2 for
all the remaining vertices, assigning removed vertices with
ks = 1. By increasing degree to k = 2, we can continue the
process, finding vertices with ks = 2. In the same manner,
all vertices in the network can be separated into groups with
different ks value, which is called the k-shell index.
k-shell index incorporates an individual vertex’s location,
providing a better measure to quantify individual importance
in spreading processes. However, its performance is not good
in spreadings with multiple index cases, since the vertices
with large ks are usually clustered with each other while those
with high degrees tend to be distributed uniformly across the
population.
Encounter Entropy
As social encounters in daily life vary significantly with
time, the importance of one vertex in temporal spreading
processes depends on the temporal diversity of individual’s
travel behavior. Thus, we define encounter entropy S - as a
special centrality for this study - to measure the diversity of
one’s travel during the week, as:
S (i) =−∑
t∈T
pt ln pt , (S2)
where pt is the probability that individual i encounters others
at time t.
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Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality Ce (i) of vertex i is defined as
Ce (i) = λ−1
N
∑
j=1
ai jei j, (S3)
where λ is the maximum eigenvalue of adjacent matrix A =
[ai j] and e= (e1,e2, · · · ,en)T is the eigenvector corresponding
to λ .
Closeness Centrality
Closeness centrality Cc(i) measures the impact of vertex i
on other vertices across the whole network, defined as:
Cc (i) =
N−1
N
∑
j=1
di j
, (S4)
where di j is length of shortest-path between i and j.
Betweenness Centrality
An important measure in social networks, betweenness
centrality Cb(i) is defined as:
Cb (i) =∑
s<t
nist
gst
, (S5)
where gst is the number of shortest-paths between vertex s and
t and nist is number of paths in gst , which includes vertex i. The
higher Cb(i) is, the more influential vertex i is in the network.
In a weighted network, the shortest path is usually calculated
using inverse weights.
When comparing sensor performance based on different
centrality measures, we did not take those with shortest path-
based centrality measures into consideration. On one hand, as
social encounters happen frequently among various subjects,
the contact network in our study has a very high density
and computing these measures could be very costly. On the
other hand, social encounters are highly determined by time;
however, the shortest path computation on a static network is
independent on temporal information.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 3: LEAD-TIME
Lead-time is a crucial measure in evaluating sensor per-
formance from simulation results. Previous attempts quan-
tify lead-time as the difference of infection time between
control/sensor groups. However, in a simulation, we can
actually trace the infection times of all individuals to better
define the cumulative infection curve α(t) = I(t)/N(t). As
Supplementary Fig. S2A and B show, lead-time actually
varies with both β and α(t) = I(t)/N(t). More importantly,
it also varies from one simulation to another. Therefore, it
might be biased to use lead-time for a fixed α to access sensor
performance (see Supplementary Fig. S2C and D), especially
when there is a strong degree of heterogeneity for different
simulation runs.
To better quantify a sensor’s importance in detecting
outbreaks early, we define the observation interval of α as
αˆ = [0.05,0.25). We chose these two values since they might
be representative for lower and upper bound to characterize
the infection ratio for a contagious outbreak.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 4: SENSOR COMPARISION
To access performance of different centrality measures
jointly, we measured the average trend of centrality change
in Supplementary Fig. S3 in terms of population sliced
obtained by corresponding centrality measures. For example,
in Supplementary Fig. S3, we show the change of average
degree 〈k〉 of the 100 slices obtained by travel frequency
(number of activities) f , k-shell index ks and encounter
entropy S, respectively. In this case, the sensors identified with
maximal travel frequency, maximal k-shell index and maximal
encounter entropy exhibit an average degree of 〈k〉 f = 918.2,
〈k〉ks = 899.5 and 〈k〉S = 1069.0, respectively.
As Supplementary Fig. S3 shows, all centrality measures
are consistent with each other, displaying decreasing treads
of average centrality on sequential sensor composition (each
covering 1% of the population). Taking Supplementary
Fig. S3 as a whole, we found no one outperforms the others
significantly among these centrality measures. However, the
top 1% sensors identified by degree and encounter entropy are
more centrally located in terms of other ks and f essentially.
In contrast, the best sensors identified by ks performs poorly
in terms of k, f and S. In fact, considering the fact that this
interaction network is composed of common daily encounters
– social links which are weak, passive and indirect – the
structural (global) centrality k-shell index may not carry as
much information as it would in a social network enabled by
personal relations. On the contrary, given the small variation
of ks compared to other local centrality such as k and f (see
Fig. 2), there are more individuals sharing the same k-shell
index than other centrality measures [19], preventing us from
identifying the most influential spreaders among them. For
example, as Supplementary Fig. S4 shows, the top sensors
obtained by k, f and S are excellent while sensors obtained
by top ks perform poorly and unreliably.
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FIG. S1. The cumulative infected ratio I/N over time for 0.01% individuals with highest degree from 20 simulations for different contagious
rate (A) β = 0.001, (B) β = 0.0015, (C) β = 0.002, (D) β = 0.005. In each panel, the temporal change of I/N across the population is also
shown for reference. The two solid lines correspond I/N = 5% and I/N = 25%.
12
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE S2
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FIG. S2. Definition of lead-time. (A) The temporal change of infected ratio α(t) = I(t)/N(t) for 1% randomly selected individuals (as control
group; solid curves) and their neighbors (as sensors; dashed curves) with β = 0.0015. We can estimate lead-time ∆T (α) = TC(α)−TS(α)
given any infected ratio α . (B) Same as in panel (A) but for β = 0.005. (C) Lead-time variation with α using the same control/sensor samples.
The markers and error bars show the mean and standard deviation from 20 simulations. Given the temporal nature of transit activities, the
spreading dynamics also varies with time and stops over night. Thus, the lead-time ∆T actually varies significantly with α . (D) The same plot
as in panel (C), but for β = 0.005.
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE S3
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FIG. S3. Comparison of different centrality measures. (A) The average degree 〈k〉 for sorted slices (1%; equal size) obtained by frequency f ,
k-shell index ks and encounter entropy S. The solid line and the dashed line show 〈k〉 of the top 1% (〈k〉k = 1335.0) and the whole population
(〈k〉P = 442.0), respectively. The average degrees of best sensors identified by other centrality measures are 〈k〉 f = 918.2, 〈k〉ks = 899.5
and 〈k〉S = 1069.0. (B)-(D), same as panel (A), for other centrality measures. (B) The corresponding values for best sensors and population
are 〈 f 〉 f = 35.0, 〈 f 〉P = 13.0, 〈 f 〉k = 25.7, 〈 f 〉ks = 16.1 and 〈 f 〉 f = 30.0. (C) The corresponding values are 〈ks〉ks = 238.3, 〈ks〉P = 167.3,〈ks〉k = 216.5, 〈ks〉 f = 202.8 and 〈ks〉S = 206.0. (D) The corresponding values are 〈S〉S = 3.09nat, 〈S〉k = 2.88nat, 〈S〉 f = 2.90nat and
〈S〉ks = 2.40nat.
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FIG. S4. Effect of sensor size on detection efficiency. (A) Lead-time provided by sensors with highest degree, with sampling rate n = |S|/ |P|
in a logarithmically spaced interval spanning from 0.001% to 100% with different contagious rate β = {0.001,0.0015,0.002,0.005}. The error
bars correspond to standard deviation of T . (This is the same plot as Fig. 4A.) (B)-(D), same plots as panel (A); however, for other centrality
measures: (B) Frequency f ; (C) k-shell index ks and (D) Encounter entropy S.
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FIG. S5. Sensitivity on number of index cases (exposed for two hours). (A-C) Temporal ratio of infected cases (A), lead-time provided by
sensors with highest degree (B) and friend sensors (C) when index case size is 10. (D-F) Index case size is 5. (G-I) Index case size is 2. In this
case, the spreading cannot reach 25% when β = 0.001 after the whole period, so lead-time is not available. As lead-time is monitored after
the explosive stage, β determines the final lead-time observations.
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FIG. S6. Sensitivity on exposed duration (10 index cases). (A-C) Temporal ratio of infected cases (A), lead-time provided by sensors with
highest degree (B) and friend sensors (C) when exposed duration is 6 hours. (D-F) Exposed duration is 12 hours. In this case, the spreading
cannot reach 25% when β = 0.001,0.0015 after the whole period, so lead-time is not available.
